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HOW NOT TO CHALLENGE THE COURT
NEAL DEviNs*

Congress should have known better, so should the Clinton
White House. By requiring a compelling justification for governmental conduct burdensome of religion and thereby "overturning" Employment Division v. Smith,' Congress and the White
House-through the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) 2 -backed the Court into a corner. Specifically, because
RFRA called for "the most demanding test known to constitutional law,"3 Congress limited the Court's role in defining the
parameters of First Amendment religious liberty protections to
clarifying ambiguous language in RFRA, rather than actually
interpreting the Constitution. Adding insult to injury, lawmakers condemned the Court for its "disastrous,"4 "dastardly and
unprovoked,"5 "devastating"6 "degradation,"7 if not "virtual[]
eliminat[ion]," of religious liberty protections. For his part,
President Clinton, invoked "the power of God," and voiced his
conviction that RFRA "was far more consistent with the intent
of the Founders of this Nation than the [Smith] decision."'

* Ernest W. Goodrich Professor of Law and Lecturer in Government, The Col-

lege of William and Mary. Julie Whysong improved this paper through her exceptional research assistance. Thanks also to Chris Eisgruber for his comments on a
draft of this Essay.
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
3. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 (1997).
4. 139 CONG. REC. H2359 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of Rep. Nadler);
137 CONG. REC. E2422 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Rep. Solarz).
5. 137 CoNG. REC. E2422 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Rep. Solarz).
6. 139 CONG. REC. H2360 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of Rep. Schumer).
7. Id. at H2361 (statement of Rep. Orton).
8. Id. at H2359 (statement of Rep. Nadler).
9. President's Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2000 (Nov. 16, 1993).
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City of Boerne v. Mores," invalidating RFRA, was the natural and inevitable result of these bad words. Citing Marbury v.
Madison," the Court in Flores declared that "[tihe power to
interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in
the Judiciary." 2 Moreover, by telling Congress that "[olur national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best
when each part of the government respects both the Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of the other
branches,"" the Court fought fire with fire.
Or did it? Notwithstanding its apparent equation of Court interpretations of the Constitution with the Constitution itself,
Mores suggests that elected officials and interest groups may find
less draconian outlets to vent their frustration with the Court. In
particular, well aware that Congress-through its Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 5 ("Section 5") enforcement power-may
sometimes remedy unconstitutional state and federal action by
"correcting" Court decisions, Mores's chief, if not only, complaint
with RFRA was that the statute operated as a naked power grab,
transferring from the Court to Congress the power to define constitutional standards of review. In this way, Mores does little
more than reaffirm the core holding of Marbury v. Madison, that
is, judicial review is necessary to ensure that the Constitution not
be "on a level with ordinary legislative acts.., alterable when the
legislature shall please to alter it."4 Indeed, unwilling to squelch
future democratic challenges to Smith, Mores does not establish
any meaningful rules governing the reaches and limits of
Congress's power to "correct" Court decisions.' 5
Mores's fuzziness exemplifies the Rehnquist Court's increasing
tendency to choose standards that allow for discretionary application instead of absolutist rules." When it comes to the bal10. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
11. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
12. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2166.
13. Id. at 2172. Under this formalistic vision, "the Court will treat its precedents
with the respect due them," id., for each branch is obligated to "act withino its
sphere of power and responsibilities." Id. at 2171.
14. Id. at 2168 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
15. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
16. On this point, see generally Kathleen Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (discussing the preference of the cur-
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ance of powers, as I will argue here, standard-based decision
making is appropriate. 7 Inflexible rules prevent the branches
from engaging in ongoing dialogues over the Constitution's
meaning--dialogues that often result in more vibrant and durable constitutional interpretation. For this reason, the Court
should have struck down RFRA. Rather than encourage dialogue
over the meaning of the Constitution's religious liberty protection, RFRA sought to silence the Supreme Court.
Ironically, Mores is open to criticism on these very grounds.
Despite its recognition that Congress can sometimes correct
errant Supreme Court decisions," Mores props up an unworkable formalistic model. The Court, for example, never acknowledged that disagreement with its rulings by lawmakers, government officials, and interest groups often plays a pivotal and
salutary role in defining constitutional values. Over time, however, Mores's suggestion that the Court's constitutional interpretations are definitive and final will give way to those social and
political forces that prompted RFRA's enactment in the first
place. Time and again, the Court has bended in the face of sustained popular resistance to its decision making. 8 In this way,
the Smith-RFRA-Mores saga is simply the opening volley in
what promises to be an ongoing and, ultimately, productive
dialogue about the meaning of First Amendment religious liberty protections.
I. THE REALPOLITIK OF CITY OF BOERNE V. FLORES

In critical respects, Mores reads like a high school civics lesson. The Court began and ended its analysis with Marbury v.
rent Supreme Court for standards over rules). With regard to the 1996-97 term, see
Cass Sunstein, Supreme Caution: Once Again the High Court Takes Only Small
Steps, WASH. POST, July 6, 1997, at C1. In addition, see generally Neal Devins &
Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Timing: Raines v. Byrd and the Modern Supreme
Court's Attempt to Control Constitutional Confrontations, 86 GEo. L.J. 351 (1997)
(discussing the Rehnquist Coures dismissal of the line-item veto case for lack of

standing).

17. For an analogous argument that the Court should delay resolution of separation-of-powers disputes and thereby encourage informal bargaining over the operation
of structural divisions of authority, see Devins & Fitts, supra note 16, at 365-75.
18. See Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2163.
19. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
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Madison, reminding Congress and the nation that, "[uinder our
Constitution... the 'powers of the legislature are defined and
limited' 20 and that the "courts retain the power.., to determine if Congress has exceeded its authority."2' Without blinking, Flores derived from Marbury that Court decisions are sacrosanct and that Congress's role is limited to "mak[ing] its own
informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution... in the first instance," that is, before the Court has spoken.2 When the Court has acted, popular government's role in
affecting constitutional change is limited to "the difficult and
detailed amendment process."'
This suggestion, of course, is nonsense. The historical record
provides overwhelming evidence that other parts of government
regularly challenge the Court's constitutional reasoning, and
that the Court is influenced by these challenges as well as the
broader social currents which surround it.' As Ruth Bader
Ginsburg noted a year before her appointment to the Supreme
Court, judges "play an interdependent part in our democracy.
They do not alone shape legal doctrine[,] ...

they participate in

a dialogue with other organs of government, and with the people
as well."25 More striking, Anthony Kennedy, in direct conflict
with his opinion for the Court in Mores, told Congress at his
confirmation hearing that they "would be fulfilling [their] duty"
by limiting the effects of Supreme Court decisions that they
believe are "wrong under the Constitution.""6
Kennedy's conflicted view of the relationship between Congress and the Court is not without explanation. Mores is em20. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 176 (1803)).
21. Id. at 2172.
22. Id. at 2171-72.
23. Id. at 2168.
24. For in depth analysis of influences that shape the court's constitutional interpretation see generally NEAL DEvINs, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES (1996); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES (1988); LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1996).
25. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185,
1198 (1992).

26. Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong. 223 (1987) (statement of Anthony Kennedy, Supreme Court nominee).
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blematic of the Supreme Court's practice of depicting itself as
having the final word on the Constitution's meaning when the
Court feels especially challenged by the other branches. For
instance, when Marbury declared that "[ult is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is,"27 Jeffersonians in Congress-through the threat of impeachment and the elimination of judgeships-sought to neuter
the Federalist-dominated judiciary.28 Cooper v. Aaron 9 is
much the same. Cooper's claim that "the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution""0 was
made in the face of massive Southern resistance to Brown v.
Board of Education,"'including Arkansas's enlistment of the
national guard to deny African American schoolchildren access
to Little Rock's Central High School." For the Rehnquist
Court, Planned Parenthood v. Casey," its 1992 decision reaffirming the "central holding" of Roe v. Wade,' nicely illustrates
this phenomenon. 5
Decided in the midst of legislative deliberation on RFRA,
Casey underscores the Court's belief that it must resist political
challenges to its independence. Refusing to bend to the stated
who appointed them and overrule Roe
desires of the presidents
"under political fire,"36 Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony
Kennedy, and David Souter "call[ed] the contending sides of a
national controversy to end their national division by accepting"
the Court's decision in Casey." Correspondingly, in acknowl-

27. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
28. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 24, at 25-35.
29. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
30. Id. at 18.
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 24, at 242-56.
33. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
35. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853.
36. Id. at 867.
37. Id. The Casey plurality waxed poetic suggesting that if the character and
legitimacy of the Court suffered, then the character and legitimacy of our Nation
would suffer because the American people's identity was "not readily separate from
their understanding of the Court [as an institution] invested with the authority to
decide their constitutional cases and speak before all others on constitutional ideals."
Id. at 868.
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edging that the Court lacked the power of the purse and sword
and that its authority therefore resided "in its legitimacy, a
product of substance and perception that shows itself in the
people's acceptance of the Judiciary,""s the Casey plurality concluded that a surrender to political pressure would result in
"profound and unnecessary damage" both to the Court and to
"the Nation's commitment to the rule of law." 9 In other words,
as psychologists Tom Tyler and Gregory Mitchell observed, the
Court seems to believe that "public acceptance of the Court's role
as interpreter of the Constitution-that is, the public belief in
the Court's institutional legitimacy-enhances public acceptance
of controversial Court decisions." 0
Notwithstanding intense congressional, presidential, and religious interest and involvement in the abortion dispute, the lessons of Casey were lost on the drafters of RFRA. Profoundly
upset by the Court's limitation of religious liberty protections to
governmental conduct that targets religion, RFRA supporters
failed to heed Casey's implicit warning about the Court's sensitivity to political challenges to its authority. Instead, RFRA
supporters invested no energy in casting their handiwork as
anything but the de jure nullification of the Supreme Court's
voice in religious liberty decision making. Making no meaningful
attempt to reconcile RFRA's "compelling justification"4 1 standard with the Court's standards governing Congress's Section 5
enforcement power,42 RFRA's legislative history can only be

38. Id. at 865.
39. Id. at 869.
40. Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 1994
DUKE L.J. 703, 715.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (1994); see infra note 42.
42. It is unclear whether such a reconciliation is possible. For arguments that
RFRA can be squared with Congress's enforcement power, see generally Douglas
Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REV. 145 (1995); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56
MONT. L. REv. 249 (1995); Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings:A
Defense of the Religious Freedom RestorationAct, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 589 (1996). For
arguments that it cannot, see generally Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: The Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56
MONT. L. REV. 39 (1995); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994);
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understood as a direct challenge to the Court's basic authority to
say "what the law is."43
Let me explain. RFRA, as an initial matter, must be understood against the backdrop of Employment Division v. Smith,"
a decision that speaks more to the judicial role in overseeing
democratic institutions than it does to the substantive meaning
of religious liberty.45 Proclaiming that "it is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance against the im46
portance of general laws the significance of religious practice,"
the Smith Court acknowledged that its test would place religious
minorities at the mercy of the political process but that discriminatory treatment was an "unavoidable consequence of democratic government."47 With that said, the Court seemed confident
that religious interests would fare well in the political marketplace, noting that "[society] can be expected to be solicitous [of
religious liberty] in its legislation" and citing, as "not surpris-

Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the
Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDozo L.
REV. 357 (1994); William W. Van Alstyne, The Failureof the Religious Freedom RestorationAct Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1996 DUKE L.J. 291.
43. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). At oral arguments,
Douglas Laycock defended RFRA by stating that the statute was "not such a dramatic power grab. The power of interpreting compelling interest remains in [the Supreme] Court." Transcript of Oral Argument, City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct.
2157 (No. 95-2074), available in 1997 WL 87109, at *42 (Feb. 19, 1997) [hereinafter
Flores Transcript]. Moreover, suggesting that in cases of purposeful discrimination
"there are sometimes advantages to the litigant in proceeding under the free exercise
claim," Laycock argued that, notwithstanding RFRA, the Smith doctrine was not a
dead letter. Id. at *43. Although I doubt the correctness of these claims, RFRA can
be understood as a frontal assault on the Court without disputing either of these
claims. More than anything, my point is about the message that Congress sent the
Court. Professor Laycock's oral argument, instead, reveals that Congress could have
portrayed RFRA as something short of the overturning of Smith. See infra notes 6469 and accompanying text.
44. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
45. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before
the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 372-95 (1992) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Prof. Ira C.
Lupu); Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at its Word: The Implications for
RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REv. 5, 6, 17 (1995).
46. Smith, 494 U.S. at 889 n.5. In this way RFRA's embrace of strict scrutiny
review gave the Justices an instruction they literally could not handle.
47. Id. at 890.
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ing," numerous religious-practice exemptions.4 8
Smith's institutional concerns did not factor into RFRA's enactment. Rather than view decisions like Smith and Casey as
emblematic of the Rehnquist Court's interest in both defining
and defending its conception of the judicial role in government,49 the RFRA lobby did little to hide its disdain for the
Court. Immediately following the Court's decision in Smith, the
litigation director for Concerned Women of America remarked
that the same conservative Justices that "all the Christians were
shouting 'hurray' about when Reagan picked them.., were all
the people who stabbed us in the back on this thing."" This
highly personal, highly incendiary rhetoric typified much of
Congress's consideration of RFRA.
Congressional hearings showcased representatives from an
"unprecedented coalition" of religious and other interest
groups. 5 With few exceptions, congressional testimony followed
this general format: an outline of the history of religious freedom in America; Supreme Court precedent for the application of
the compelling interest standard in free exercise cases; a direct
attack on the logic of Smith (almost universally condemning the
Court's use of the word "luxury" to describe how the compelling
interest requirement benefits religious liberty plaintiffs); a prediction about or description of decisions that may or did result
from the Smith standard; and a demand for a return to the
freedom our nation has always cherished.5 2 Very few of the witnesses challenged the legislation, and nearly all of the witnesses
attacked Smith, often by demanding that Congress overturn the
decision. Illustrative of the hearings were the comments of three

48. Id.

49. See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (declining "the invitation"
of the Justice Department under President Bush to reconsider Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971)); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (rejecting feder-

al efforts to limit the effect of Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), a decision
prohibiting criminal prosecution of flag burning).
50. High Court Urged to Reconsider, WASH. POST, May 12, 1990, at Cll.

51. 139 CONG. REC. H2357 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of Rep. Brooks).
52. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearing on H.R. 5377
Before Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. 16-24 (1990) (statement of Rep. Solarz); id. at 30-37 (statement of Rev.
Dean M. Kelley, Counselor on Religious Liberty, National Council of Churches).
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members of the "Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion": for
Robert Dugan, Jr., representing the National Association of
Evangelicals, Smith "deprived us of our birthright as Americans"
and must be "overrule[d];"

3

for Dallin H. Oaks, from the

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the Mormon
Church), the statutory specification of a compelling interest
standard was "a legitimate and a necessary response by the
legislative branch to the degradation of religious freedom resulting from the Smith case;"' and for Oliver S. Thomas, general
counsel of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, Smith
was the "Dred Scott of first amendment law."55
Lawmakers read from a nearly identical script, routinely condemning Smith and calling upon their colleagues to reverse it.5"
Lawmakers and the White House also paid homage to RFRA's
interest group sponsors, applauding the Coalition for the Free
Exercise of Religion," one of the broadest coalitions ever assembled to support a bill before Congress, for spanning "ideological and religious lines."" Correspondingly, with no meaningful
interest group resistance, constitutional roadblocks were not
placed in front of RFRA, and, as such, Congress barely touched
upon the question of whether the Supreme Court would approve
of RFRA. For example, Congress did not engage in the type of
fact finding that would place RFRA within the ambit of the
Court's, admittedly murky, Section 5 precedent. Congress did
not make specific findings of fact "that formally neutral, generally applicable laws have historically been instruments of religious
persecution, that enacting separate religious exemptions in every statute is not a workable means of protecting religious liber-

53. Hearings, supra note 45, at 10, 14 (statement of Mr. Dugan).
54. Id. at 25 (statement of Mr. Oaks).
55. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearings on S. 2969 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 42 (1992) (statement of Mr. Thomas).
56. For a sampling of lawmaker comments, see supra notes 4-8 and accompanying
text. Lawmakers, however, paid scant attention to the pre-Smith Court's failure to
vigorously apply strict scrutiny review in religious liberty cases. See Eisgruber &
Sager, supra note 42, at 495-97.
57. See 139 CONG. REC. S14362 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
58. President's Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, 2 PUB. PAPERs 2000 (Nov. 16, 1993).
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ty, and that litigation about governmental motives is not a workable means of protecting religious liberty."59 Instead, Congress
was content to do precisely what RFRA's interest group sponsors
asked for, that is, repudiate Smith as inconsistent with the
Framers' intent through legislation that would not protect neutral laws that burdened religion."°
The Supreme Court had no choice but to view RFRA as a
frontal assault on its authority. For starters, Congress's power to
correct the Court through positive law invariably raises profound questions about the appropriate balance of authority between the judiciary and democratic government. 6 These institutional concerns, moreover, figured prominently in Smith.6 2
RFRA's doctrinal context therefore sensitized the Court to judicial independence concerns."
With its antenna already up, the scope and legislative history
of RFRA, quite appropriately, pushed the Court over the edge.
In particular, RFRA's embrace of strict scrutiny review effectively limited the judicial role to the application of the statutory
compelling justification test.' More significant, no matter how

59. See Hearings, supra note 45, at 331 (testimony of Prof. Douglas Laycock).
Congress, of course, could have made these factual findings without pursuing these
matters at legislative hearings. It did not, despite being advised that such fact finding would strengthen RFRA's constitutionality. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)(1)-(4)
(1994).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (1994). Indeed, rather than reinstate the status quo
at the time of Smith, RFRA provided for greater protection of religious liberty than
the Court did at the time of Smith or, for that matter, any other time. See
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 42 at 445-52.
61. For a sampling of this literature, see Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan 'Power"
and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819
(1986); Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in ConstitutionalLaw Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV.
1 (1993); Peter M. Shane, Voting Rights and the "Statutory Constitution", LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 243; Van Alstyne, supra note 42, at 291.
62. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. The instrumental role played by
religious interests in RFRA's enactment, moreover, lends credence to Smith's conclusion that religious interests are well protected in the political marketplace. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
63. The fact that RFRA imposed huge costs on state and local governments by requiring them to satisfy strict review whenever their conduct burdened religion, added to this sensitivity. See Steven G. Calabresi, A Constitutional Revolution, WALL ST.
J., July 10, 1997, at A14.
64. In responding to Douglas Laycock's claim that the Court preserves its "judicial
independen[ce]" through its interpretation of RFRA, Chief Justice Rehnquist re-
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its proponents dressed it, the legislative history of RFRA
smelled, looked, and tasted like a populist abrogation of the judicial function." The story of RFRA features accusations of judicial incompetence and insensitivity;6 6 congressional hearings
that, for the most part, operated as a special-interest lovefest;7
repeated assertions that RFRA overturned, not supplemented,
Supreme Court decision making;" and congressional disinterest

in finding facts that would suggest RFRA corrected, rather than
overruled, Smith.6 9

The Court could not ignore this legislative history, especially
when confronted with a statute as sweeping as RFRA° Congress, the White House, and interest groups challenged the
Court's credibility and authority. Put on the defensive, as it was
in Casey, the Court used Flores to emphasize first principles and
marked "if we're faithful to our oaths we've got to say, we're looking at what Congress meant by this.... [Tihat's not nearly the same thing as having, as Marbury
said, the final word on what the Constitution means." Flores Transcript, supra note
43, at *41. More precisely, because RFRA adopts "the most demanding test known
to constitutional law," City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 (1997), it is
impossible for the Court to reinvigorate constitutionally-based religious liberty decision making by, for example, holding that Smith is constitutionally infirm.
65. No doubt, as RFRA's defenders' claim, floor debates did address the statute's
constitutionality and congressional hearings featured some constitutional scholars, at
least two of whom discussed the circumstances under which the Supreme Court
might uphold RFRA. See Robin-Vergeer, supra note 42, at 608-12. It is also true
that both the Senate and House Reports, despite acknowledging that the purpose of
RFRA was to "overturn" Smith, concluded ipse dixit that RFRA was "a new statutory prohibition" that "d[id] not purport to legislate the standard of review to be applied" in constitutional litigation. S. REP. No. 103-111, reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892-1912, at 14 n.43, 19 (1993); accord H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 6-7,
14 (1993). Notwithstanding Congress's consideration of RFRA's constitutionality, there
is very little in the statute's legislative history to signal to the Court that democratic government seriously considered the Court's decisions and its status as a coequal
branch. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 5-7 (discussing Smith and its impact).
66. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
67. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 2 (listing the members of the pro-RFRA organizations that testified before the Committee).
68. See id. at 8-9, 12, 14.
69. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
70. It is also noteworthy that RFRA spawned countless law review articles, most
of which challenged its constitutionality. Without overstating the importance of this
scholarly "culture of expectations" to the Supreme Court's decision making, there is
some reason to think that legal academics can have a conditioning influence on the
Court. See Lawrence Marshall, Intellectual Feasts and Intellectual Responsibility, 84
Nw. U. L. REV. 832, 842-50 (1990).

656

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:645

to lecture the nation on the importance of judicial independence
to the "rule of law."
Flores, although decisive in its invalidation of RFRA, sheds
little light on congressional authority to correct Supreme Court
decisions." Concluding that Congress's Section 5 power is limited to "[1]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations,"7 2 but acknowledging that "the line between measures
that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures
that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy
to discern,"7" Flores settled on an extraordinarily amorphous
standard: Is there a "congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted
to that end?"74 By choosing "[a]gainst [tiheories, [a]gainst
[r]ules" and focusing "their attention only on what is necessary
to decide" the case before them,75 Flores allows the Court to
pick and choose the Section 5 battles it will fight with Congress.
Moreover, recognizing that "Congress must have wide latitude in
determining" 6 whether its corrective legislation is, in fact, remedial, Flores acknowledged Congress's power to engage the
Court in constitutional dialogues.7 7

71. Similarly, although sensitive to "the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens," City of
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2159 (1997), Flores is of limited value to the ongoing debate about federalism-based limits on congressional action. See Stephen
Gardbaum, The Federalism Implications of Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665
(1998); Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Supremacy and the Settlement Function, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 849 (1998).
72. Flores, 117 S.Ct. at 2163.
73. Id. at 2164.
74. Id. at 2163. RFRA is an easy case, even under this nebulous standard.
Congress's objectives are patently nonremedial. "[RFRA] appears, instead, to attempt
a substantive change in constitutional protections." Id. at 2170.
75. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4,
14 (1995); see also Sullivan, supra note 16, at 56-95 (discussing the current Supreme
Court's preference for standards over rules).
76. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
77. For example, nothing in Flores suggested that the Court will question the
legality of Congress's repudiation of City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), in
which the Court required proof of discriminatory intent as a basis for voting rights
litigation. Recognizing, among other things, that the combination of at-large election
schemes and racial block voting will disenfranchise racial minorities, Congress-as
part of its 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act--concluded that the "intent
test focuses on the wrong question and places an unacceptable burden upon plain-
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Flores'srecognition that Congress will, on occasion, correct the
Court is quite consistent with its strong words about the judicial

function. The Justices, for the most part, understand that they
cannot definitively settle divisive political controversies.78 To
suggest otherwise, that is, for the Court to declare itself the
"ultimate interpreter" of the Constitution, and mean it, is an
obvious invitation to disaster. Court packing, court stripping,
impeachment, and general disregard of unpopular decision making might well follow in the wake of a Court that sees its authority over the Constitution as second to none. 79 For this rea-

son, although the Justices will, up to a point, suffer fools on the
Hill, the Court must resist direct challenges to its institutional
0 and intimaindependence. Citations to Marbury v. Madison"
tions of judicial supremacy in Cooper v. Aaron,"' the Nixon

tiffs in voting discrimination cases." S. REP. No. 97-417, at 13 (1982). Despite similarities between voting rights legislation and RFRA (the explicit repudiation of a
Court decision and the substitution of a legislatively crafted impact test for a judicially devised intent test), there are critical differences between the two measures.
Unlike RFRA, which denies the judiciary a meaningful voice in religious freedom
decision making, voting rights legislation has hardly quieted the*Court's voice. Starting with Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), the Supreme Court has issued several
landmark voting rights decisions. The Bolden legislation, moreover, is part of an ongoing dialogue between the Court and Congress on voting rights. The 1982 amendments, for example, came in the wake of Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966), which upheld Congress's repudiation of Court-approved literacy tests. See
Shane, supra note 61, at 260. It is also relevant that the 1982 voting rights reforms
were not limited to the Bolden question and, as such, did more than simply challenge the Court. Finally, due to early opposition to the impact standard by both the
Reagan administration and some of the Republican leadership, Congress and interest
groups invested significant energy in addressing the constitutionality of the voting
rights changes and, with it, developing an evidentiary record that, compared to
RFRA at least, supported the need for corrective legislation. For a thumbnail sketch
of the 1982 amendment's legislative history, see FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 24, at
274-88.
78. John Marshalrs sequencing of the merits and jurisdiction in Marbury and Earl
Warren's efforts at crafting a unanimous opinion in Brown by limiting the decision's
scope are but two notable examples of Justices taking into account the political repercussions of unpopular decisions. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 24, at 25-35,
242-56.
79. See generally Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political
Instability 84 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998) (describing the negative consequences
of exclusive judicial supremacy on constitutional interpretation).
80. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
81. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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tapes case,82 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey' are classic examples of this phenomenon.
So is Flores. The Court protects its turf without forbidding
subsequent entreaties. Moreover, because its proportionality test
is so fluid, the Court can pay close attention to the circumstances surrounding future congressional invocations of Section 5. For
a Court seeking to preserve its status in the government, Flores
is an eminently sensible and predictable decision.

II. SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
Mores's balancing act is more than predictable. By defending
its institutional authority while allowing for future populist
challenges to its decision making, the Court in Fores recognized-albeit grudgingly-the centrality of vigorous interchanges
between the Court, elected government, and the public in shaping constitutional values. RFRA, in contrast, was an outright
repudiation of the judicial function. The Court, relegated to
interpreting congressionally specified standards, no longer had a
voice in defining the content of First Amendment religious liberty protections. Unlike mechanisms designed to prompt the Court
to reconsider Smith, say, the appointment of Supreme Court
nominees who may well disagree with the decision or the enactment of legislation exempting specific religious practices,'
RFRA's slash and burn approach to dialogues between the Court
and elected government promotes acrimony between the branches and little else.
RFRA's failings are about more than the technical preservation of three discrete branches of government. Judges and politi82. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
83. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

84. For examples of narrowly focused congressional exemptions of religious practice, see National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 § 508,
10 U.S.C. § 774 (1994) (limiting reach of Supreme Court decision in Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), by allowing members of armed services to wear an
item of religious apparel on their uniform); American Indian Religious Freedom Act
Amendments of 1994, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1996a (West 1996) (limiting reach of Smith by
exempting, from state and federal criminal prosecution, the ceremonial use of peyote
by Indians). For examples of state exemptions of religious practice, see Neal Devins,
Fundamentalist Christian Educators v. State: An Inevitable Compromise, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 818 (1992).
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cians sometimes react differently to social and political forces.
Congress, for example, focuses its "energy mostly on the claims
of large populous interests, or on the claims of the wealthy and
the powerful, since that tends to be the best route to re-election." ' Courts, in contrast, are less affected by these pressures,
for judges possess life tenure.8 6 Accordingly, because special
interest group pressures affect courts and elected officials in
different ways, a government-wide decision-making process
encourages a full-ranging consideration of the costs and benefits
of different policy outcomes. For this reason, both courts and
elected officials should be activists in shaping government policy.
This politicization of constitutional discourse, while contributing to partisan value-laden constitutional analysis,8 7 is better
than the alternatives-legislative or judicial supremacy. Legislative supremacy, as lores recognized, would blur the line separating the Constitution from ordinary laws." Moreover, subject to
the pressures ofreelection, "legislatures are too likely to get caught
up in the passions of the moment, be they flag burning, alleged
communists in the State Department, or the need to really sock it
to various types of criminal defendants." 9 For progressives and
conservatives alike, lawmakers' propensity to do that which is
politically expedient makes legislative supremacy unpalatable.
Judicial exclusivity, like legislative supremacy, creates more
problems than it solves. "When technologies are changing rapidly, when facts or values are unclear and when democracy is in a
state of moral flux, courts [with limited fact finding capacity and
inability to respond quickly to changing circumstances] should
recognize that they may not have the best or final answers. " '
Moreover, lacking the powers of purse and sword, as Casey rec-

85. Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 269, 273
(1993).
86. See id. As to what judges maximize, see Richard Posner, What Do Judges and
Justices Maximize?, 3 SuP. CT. ECON. REv. 1 (1993).
87. See Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF 3
(1996).
88. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1

Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
89. Calabresi, supra note 85, at 272.
90. Sunstein, supra note 16, at Cl; see also DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE CoURTS AND
SOCIAL POLICY (1977) (discussing the expanded lawmaking function of the judiciary).
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ognized, the Court's authority is necessarily tied to "the people's
acceptance of the Judiciary.""' The Court is well aware of this;
for example, in explaining the extraordinary importance of public opinion in its decision making, Justice Owen Roberts, whose
alleged "switch in time" saved the Lochner Court from
Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, 2 acknowledged that "[1]ooking
back, it is difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the
popular urge for uniform standards throughout the country.""
Popular acceptance of the Court then, cannot be divorced from
social and political pressures. Otherwise, democratic institutions
and the public at large will reject the Court and, in so doing,
diminish its stature.94
To be sure, those who believe that Congress is not "ideologically committed or institutionally suited to search for the meaning of constitutional values" may question the practicality of this
dynamic decision-making model. 5 Populist constitutional interpretation, however, serves as an important foil for the Court.
Ever since Thomas Jefferson declared the Alien and Sediti6n
Act, which criminalized speech critical of the government, a
constitutional "nullity" and pardoned everyone convicted under
it, 96 the executive and legislative branches have limited the effects of Court rulings, more often than not by providing for
greater individual rights protection than the judiciary.97

91. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
92. For a thoughtful, provocative treatment of the nexus between Court-packing
and the Court's doctrinal transformation, see Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New
Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201 (1994).
93. OWEN J. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1951).
94. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 79 (manuscript at 161, on file with author).
For a competing perspective, see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial ConstitutionalInterpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).
95. Owen Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1979); see also
Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61
N.C. L. REv. 587 (1983) (arguing that lawmakers have little incentive to seriously
consider constitutional questions). For an opposing view, see Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707 (1985) (arguing
that Congress has the institutional capacity to interpret the Constitution).
96. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 11
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42-44 (Albert Ellerly Bergh ed., 1904).
97. For an early defense of this claim, see Henry W. Edgerton, The Incidence of
Judicial Control over Congress, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 299 (1937). For a more recent defense, see Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 241 (1993).
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Democratic attempts to limit Smith are much the same. "Given the breadth of support for RFRA both within and outside of
Congress, it would be difficult to imagine a piece of congressional legislation that could more powerfully demonstrate a societal
consensus concerning the meaning of a constitutional provision."" While RFRA went too far-taking this consensus and
shoving it down the Justices' throats-a moderation of Smith's
cramped view of religious liberty may well be in order. Over
time, as was true with legislative and executive challenges to
the Alien and Sedition Act, the Court may conclude that Smith
has been invalidated by "the court of history."99
The prospect of the Court backing away from Smith in the
face of popular resistance is anything but disquieting. "[O]ur
ability to combine active democracy, constitutional principles,
and judicial judgment"0 0 rejects the notion of an ultimate constitutional interpreter in favor of a dynamic process. Contrary to
suggestions that judicial supremacy is necessary to stave off
"interpretive anarchy,"'0 ' social and political forces outside the
courts help make the Constitution more relevant, more vital.
Bickel described the courts as engaged in a "continuing colloquy"
with political institutions and society at large, a process in
which constitutional principle is "evolved conversationally not
perfected unilaterally." 2
Balance-of-powers disputes, in particular, are best resolved
through this process of give-and-take between the branches.
"[Tihe success of a shift in formal powers from one branch or
institution to another depends ultimately on how easily the other branches, as well as the public at large, may be able to respond through formal and informal venues to the change."'
This repeat player aspect to separation-of-powers disputes dis-

98. Conkle, supra note 42, at 89.
99. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1967).
100. JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTrTUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 167
(1984).
101. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 94, at 1379.
102. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 254 (1962).
103. Michael A. Fitts, The Foibles of Formalism:Applying A Political "Transaction
Cost" Analysis to Separation of Powers, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1643, 1653-54
(1997).
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tinguishes them from many traditional challenges because the
branches are forced over time to react to and make accommodations with each other. For this reason, when it comes to
Congress's Section 5 authority to correct the Supreme Court,
there are great benefits to a fluid decision-making rule. Flores
serves up such a rule °4 and, as such, facilitates constitutional
dialogues between the courts and elected government.
Flores is far from perfect, however. In defending its institutional turf, the Court in Flores embraced a formalistic vision of
the separation of powers. Through repeated citations to
Marbury, the Court claimed that each branch must act "within
its sphere of power and responsibilities"" 5 and that "[tihe power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains
in the Judiciary."0 6 Moreover, concluding that the Court must
resist "the political branches of the Government [when they] act
against the backdrop of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued,"' 7 Flores sounds like a paean to judicial
supremacy. To be sure, placed alongside Flores's modest, indeterminate holding, this sweeping rhetoric seems, more than anything, a statement of the Court's sensitivity to those social and
political forces which engulf it. Nonetheless, this formalistic
rhetoric is disquieting. It suggests an institutional
compartmentalization that is overly parochial, ultimately shortsighted, and factually inaccurate.
"There is a magnetic attraction to the notion of an ultimate
constitutional interpreter," wrote Walter Murphy, "just as there
is a magnetic pull of some passkey to constitutional interpretation that will, if properly turned, always open the door to truth,
justice, and the American way."' 8 But just as finality "is not
the language of politics,"0" constitutional decision making is a
never-ending process. The ongoing struggle between the Court

104. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997).
105. Id. at 2171.
106. Id. at 2166. This suggestion, that Marbury supports judicial supremacy, is bogus. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 24, at 10-12, 17-18, 25-35.
107. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
108. Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter,48 REV. POL. 401, 417 (1986).
109. Id. (quoting Benjamin Disraeli).
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and Congress over the meaning of religious liberty reveals this
basic truth of our system of government. Flores's holding, if not
its rhetoric, recognizes the necessity of this interactive process.

III. CONCLUSION: WHAT'S NEXT
Congress, the White House, and interest groups were justified
in expressing their disagreement with Smith. Nevertheless,
democratic challenges to Smith fell short. By repeatedly and
unhesitatingly proclaiming their authority to "undo" Court efforts to limit First Amendment protections of governmental
conduct that targeted religion, Congress and the White House
sought to beat the Court into submission, but not to engage it in
a dialogue about religious liberty protections. Although conversations between the courts and elected government can be
sharp, even bitter, RFRA was not about conversations, and as
such, Flores was as correct as it was inevitable.
From RFRA's ashes, a constructive conversation between the
courts and democratic government may emerge."' Admitting
that the Justices had good reason to view RFRA as "encroaching
on the Court's domain," lawmakers and interest groups are
turning their attention to "more narrowly written laws."' For
example, through its power of the purse, Congress can condition
federal grants on state compliance with federal standards governing the protection of religious liberty."' Congress, moreover, could exempt specific religious practices from Smith, practices where the Smith standard cloaks pernicious discrimina-

110. The focus of this section is federal governmental challenges to Smith. States,
of course, are not bound by Flores's Section 5 analysis and, under Smith, are free to
exempt religious practices from state law.
111. Linda Greenhouse, Laws Are Urged to Protect Religion, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
1997, at A15; see also T.R. Goldman, Back in Congress' Court, LEGAL TIMES, July
14, 1997, at 8 (discussing potential actions Congress may take in response to the
Flores decision).
112. See Greenhouse, supra note 111, at A15. Congress made effective use of its
spending powers in prompting recalcitrant Southern states to comply with nondiscrimination in education objectives. See GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 2-3 (1969).
Between 1963 and 1968, for example, the percentage of black children in all-black
schools in the South dropped from 98% to 25%. See GARY ORFIELD, PUBLIC SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1968-1980 5 (1983).
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tion."' Correspondingly, the executive may seek to expand religious liberty protections through its powers to interpret statutes,
launch regulatory initiatives, and file briefs before the Supreme
Court."4 Congress and the White House, finally, may use the
appointments and confirmation process to put Justices sympathetic to the rights of religious minorities on the Court.
What Congress ought not to do is engage the Court in a dogfight over its authority to strike down RFRA. Claims made by
Senators Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah),
that "[w]e cannot take this no' [sic] from the Supreme
Court,""5 and that the "Court has thrown down the gauntlet,
and we intend to pick it up,""' will incite, not engage, the
Court. In contrast, by accepting Flores, lawmakers and interest
groups may learn that the Court is willing to take part in a
dialogue over both the reach of Smith and Congress's power to
counteract the decision. Unlike RFRA, this dialogue may allow
all parts of government and the public to come together in crafting a mutually acceptable understanding of religious liberty.
Although such constitutional decision making may seem unprincipled, it appropriately reflects a system, like ours, in which
courts do not guard constitutional rights alone. "Courts," as
Justice Ginsburg rightly observed at her confirmation hearings,
"share that profound responsibility with Congress, the
[Plresident, the states, and the people."" '

113. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2169 (1997) (suggesting that
Congress may utilize its Section 5 power when its focus is "the object or purpose" of
state conduct). It is unclear whether, under Fores, Congress could extend RFRA-like
protections throughout the federal government. For an argument that Flores is limited to Congress's power vis-h-vis the states, see Kent Greenawalt, Why Now Is Not
the Time for Constitutional Amendment: The Limited Reach of City of Boerne v.
Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 689 (1998).
114. The Clinton White House, for example, issued guidelines protecting religious
expression in the federal workplace. See Peter Baker, Workplace Religion Policy Due,
WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1997, at Al.
115. Equal Time: The Supreme Court's Revocation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (CNBC television broadcast, June 27, 1997), available in LEXIS, News Library, Script file (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
116. Id. (statement of Sen. Hatch).
117. Joan.Biskupic, Ginsburg Stresses Value of Incremental Change, WASH. POST,
July 21, 1993, at A6.

